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I.

INTRODUCTION: COURTS AS CREATURES OF LOGIC

In one of his most vigorous dissents, the late United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: "one of the benefits of
leaving regulation ... to the people rather than to the courts is that
the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion."1 This premise takes on special relevance in Eighth

*

At the time of writing this article, Carrola was a Juris Doctorate candidate at the

Duquesne University School of Law. He graduated in May 2019 and, this article was edited
in Spring 2020, at which time Carrola was an Assistant District Attorney with the District
Attorney's Office of Washington County, Pennsylvania. Any opinions expressed herein are
personal to Carrola and do not reflect those held by the Washington County District Attorney's Office. Carrola thanks Legal Research and Writing Professor Julia M. Glencer for her
painstaking assistance in editing this article and for strengthening its theme through exhaustive questioning and testing of its foundational premises.
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Federal courts are
blunt instruments when it comes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only to
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Amendment sentencing jurisprudence into which the United States
Supreme Court has invited the concept of "proportionality." 2 Proportionality requires some degree of correlation between an offense
3
and a punishment and between an offender and a punishment.
The trouble with this approach is the lack of guidelines to aid courts
in making this determination. As was once observed by Supreme
Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger:
[n]or... are we endowed with Solomonic wisdom that permits
us to draw principled distinctions between sentences of different length for a chronic "repeater" who has demonstrated that
he will not abide by the law. The simple truth is that "[n]o
neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal court to hold
that in a given situation individual crimes are too trivial in re4
lation to the punishment imposed."
Making matters worse, the Supreme Court has essentially
adopted its "own judgment" as one of the elements by which it tests
the constitutionality of punishments: "[flor the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear
on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment." 5 In extreme and obvious cases, courts can
successfully meet the constitutional requirement of proportionality
in sentencing by exercising their own judgment.6 But in close-call
situations, courts are placed in the unhappy position of making
bright-line policy decisions that are incapable of being sourced in
logic. 7 Such unbridled logic culminates in a bottomless pit: "[n]or
does the Court suggest a stopping point for its reasoning. If juries
cannot make appropriate determinations in cases involving murderers under eighteen, in what other kinds of cases will the Court
8
find jurors deficient?"
The area of juvenile sentencing jurisprudence has been particularly fraught with logical difficulties as demonstrated by United

resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise from
the exercise of a new right.").
2. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 602 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
3. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
4. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
5. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (stating that "[e]ven one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold").
7. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 621 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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States v. Grant,9 a recent decision by a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The case evidences what
happens when judges substitute logical reasoning for what is
properly an exercise of bright-line policy determinations. The case
involved Corey Grant, a homicide offender who was convicted in
1992 for various crimes that he committed when he was sixteen
years old. 10 The trial court had found that Grant would "never be
fit to reenter society"11 and had sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), on November 10, 1992.12 The
Third Circuit affirmed the conviction on August 23, 1993.13 It
seemed the story was over.
But then, the United States Supreme Court handed down a trilogy of opinions that had the effect of throwing Grant a lifeline: Graham v. Florida,14 Miller v. Alabama,15 and Montgomery v. Louisiana.1 3 These three cases invalidated life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole as a constitutionally valid punishment for certain classes of juvenile offenders. 17 The actual holdings of these
three opinions are narrower than-and therefore, do not accomplish-the prophylactic mandate which they evoke. For this reason,
courts, as creatures of logic, are sorely tempted to extend the protections granted by these opinions. And, in Grant,the Third Circuit
decided it was logical to do just that. 18 The impenetrable question
before the Grant court was, given that a juvenile offender sentenced
to imprisonment must be given a "meaningful opportunity to obtain
release," 19 how many years of imprisonment is too many years? In
answering this question, the Third Circuit panel made a bright-line
policy determination of its own. Under the panel's holding, a juvenile offender is constitutionally required to be afforded an oppor20
tunity for release from prison before the age of sixty-five.

9.
10.
11.
12.
2014).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
736.
18.
19.
20.

887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 134.
Id.
Grant v. United States, No. 12-6844 (JLL), 2014 WL 5843847, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 12,
United States v. Grant, 6 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1993) (table).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
567 U.S. 460 (2012).
136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61-62; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at
United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2018).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
Grant, 887 F.3d at 151-52.

2 2020

How Long Is Too Long?

327

If this was "Solomonic wisdom" on display, then Solomonic wisdom certainly has a chameleonic quality.2 1 Perhaps second-guessing is a natural byproduct that occurs when courts dabble in policy
making. Once a court is un-moored from the legislative decision, it
is hard to decide between the many untapped and, at times, competing potentials. Tellingly, the Third Circuit did not leave its
Grant opinion untouched for even a year. The opinion was filed on
April 9, 2018.22 Merely six months later, on October 4, 2018, the
Third Circuit vacated the panel's opinion and judgment announced
in Grant and scheduled rehearing en banc for February 20, 2019.23
The purpose of this article will be to recommend a course of action
to the Third Circuit in view of prior Eighth Amendment doctrine.
This article will begin by covering the history of proportionality
in Eighth Amendment sentencing jurisprudence and examine how
it blossomed into Graham,24 Miller,25 and Montgomery. 2 Then, it
will examine Grant against the backdrop of these cases and attempt
to demonstrate how the Third Circuit's dilemma is a symptom of
the uncertainty manufactured by the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence. Finally, it will make the argument that whatever the
Third Circuit ultimately holds, it must send a clear message to the
Supreme Court that the mandates of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery are unworkable and that unwavering guidance is needed.
This article will also suggest two provisional fixes which the Third
27
Circuit might adopt until the Supreme Court or Congress speaks.

II.

PROPORTIONALITY AND THE CATEGORICAL PROHIBITION

Proportionality has persistently clung to the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment sentencing jurisprudence. But perhaps the
Court was not always earnest about it. In any case, as early as
1892, at least one Justice contemplated that "[t]he [Eighth Amendment] inhibition is directed, not only against punishments [which
inflict torture], but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses
21. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
22. Grant, 887 F.3d at 131.
23. United States v. Grant, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (mem.) (granting rehearing en
bane).
24. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
25. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
26. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).
27. How the Supreme Court should ultimately fix the problem (should certiorari be
sought and granted) is outside the scope of this article, which seeks to press upon readers the
untenable nature of the current state of affairs and proposes some stopgap measures that
the Third Circuit could adopt after rehearing.

328

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

charged."28 The Court itself first harnessed the concept of proportionality in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by placing categorical prohibitions on capital punishment imposed for certain clas29
ses of crimes and on certain classes of offenders.
The first cases instituting categorical prohibitions on the death
penalty did so with respect to certain types of offenses. In Coker v.
Georgia,30 the Supreme Court held that the punishment of death is
disproportionate, and therefore categorically prohibited, for the
crime of rape.3 1 The Supreme Court engaged in a two-part analysis,
first seeking "objective evidence of the country's present judgment
concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an
adult woman," 32 and second, bringing its own judgement to bear on
the question. 33 The Court's holding hinged upon the distinction it
drew between the finality of murder (for which the death penalty
was permissible) and the temporary nature of rape (for which it
held the death penalty impermissible). 34 The dissent voiced concern
that the Court's holding barred the state "from guaranteeing its citizens that they [would] suffer no further attacks by this habitual
rapist." 35 The dissent's concerns were particularly poignant in
Coker, where the perpetrator had already been serving consecutive
life terms for three prior rapes when he managed to escape from
prison and commit the crime that was then before the Court. 36 Over
the next three decades, the Supreme Court would continue to apply
37
categorical prohibitions on capital punishment for certain crimes.
The first case to institute a categorical prohibition on the death
penalty with respect to a certain class of offenders was Thompson v.
Oklahoma.38 In that case, there was no claim "that the punishment
would [have been] excessive if the crime had been committed by an
40
adult."39 But the crime was perpetrated by a fifteen-year-old boy,
28. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
29. Daniel Cardenal, Applying the Narrow ProportionalityPrinciple to Juvenile Offenders: Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 130 (2011)
(examining the use of the proportionality principle in juvenile sentencing).
30. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
31. Id. at 592, 597.
32. Id. at 593.
33. Id. at 597.
34. Id. at 598 ("The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over
for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.").
35. Id. at 605-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
37. See, e.g., Kennedyv. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (aggravated rape of a child);
Enmund v.Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (robbery without intent to kill).
38. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
39. Id. at 819.
40. Id.
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and the Court accepted the premise that "some offenders are simply
too young to be put to death."41 The boy, along with three older
friends, had mercilessly beaten his brother-in-law before shooting
him twice, slashing his throat, chest, and abdomen, and throwing
the victim's body into a river. 42 The boy was later heard to brazenly
take personal credit for the lethal acts. 43 Each participant was con44
victed and received a death sentence.
The Thompson Court opined that "[i]nexperience, less education,
and less intelligence make [teenagers] less able to evaluate the consequences of [their] conduct." 45 "[Y]outh," the Court remarked in a
phrase that would become a mainstay of its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, "is more than a chronologicalfact."4 In Thompson,
the Court first coined the phrase "categorical prohibition" 47 and
then instituted such a categorical prohibition on capital punishment for offenders under sixteen years of age. 48 The Court relied in
part on the "proposition" that "less culpability should attach to a
crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult."49 In Thompson, the Court pointedly refused to
extend the prohibition to juveniles between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen. 50 That shoe would not drop until nearly seventeen years
51
later.
As these cases demonstrate, by the early 1980s proportionality in
the form of categorical prohibitions on capital punishment was wellestablished. 52 Whether, and how, proportionality would be applied
41. Id. at 828-29.
42. Id. at 819.
43. See id. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion highlighted, the record provided that Thompson had bragged about the murder to his girlfriend,
mother, and others. Id. One witness recounted that "she [had] asked Thompson the source
of some hair adhering to a pair of boots he was carrying [and he] replied that was where he
had kicked Charles Keene in the head." Id. at 860. Another witness had "told Thompson
that a friend had seen Keene dancing in a local bar, [to which] Thompson remarked that that
would be hard to do with a bullet in his head." Id. at 861. Finally, "one of Thompson's
codefendants admitted that after Keene had been shot twice in the head Thompson had cut
Keene 'so the fish could eat his body." Id.
44. Id. at 819 (majority opinion).
45. Id. at 835.
46. Id. at 834 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 821.
48. Id. at 838.
49. Id. at 835 (footnote omitted) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982),
where the Court vacated and remanded a juvenile's death sentence because state courts refused to consider mitigating circumstances).
50. Id. at 838.
51. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Enmundv. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (describing the Eighth Amendment prohibition as being "directed, in part, against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportionedto the offenses charged") (quotations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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in the context of prison sentences remained uncertain. 53 This was
so despite the fact that the Court, nearly seventy years earlier, had
referenced proportionality in a case holding unconstitutional a species of imprisonment. 54 Specifically, in Weems v. United States, a
form of punishment levied against those convicted of defrauding the
Government of the Philippine Islands-then under American
rule-was challenged. 55 The punishment, called cadena temporal,
was essentially a term of imprisonment complemented by chains
and painful labor. 5 In its analysis, the Weems Court contrasted the
relative severity of cadena temporal against more innocuous punishments prescribed for similar crimes 57 and stated that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense."5 8 Over a decade later, the Court would
once again allude to proportionality while invalidating a punishment, this time with regard to a statute which criminalized drug
addiction and imposed a mandatory minimum term of ninety days'
imprisonment. 59 As if an after-thought to its analysis, the Court
remarked: "[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."630
Despite these early and continued references to proportionality
in the context of imprisonment, the Court then had to wrestle with
whether proportionality was suited to analyzing the constitutionality of prison sentences. In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court reasoned
that its "decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments to capital cases [were] of limited assistance" in deciding the constitutionality of a sentence of imprisonment because
such a sentence, "no matter how long," differs in kind from a sentence of death. 1 The Rummel Court noted that unlike the categor-

53. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (rejecting the applicability of
proportionality in the context of a challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment).
54. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
55. See id. at 357-58, 360.
56. Id. at 364.
57. Id. at 380-81.
58. Id. at 367 (emphasis added). The Court also quoted the following language contained
in O'Neil from 1892: "the inhibition was directed not only against punishments which inflict
torture, 'but against all punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged.' . . . The whole inhibition is against that which is
excessive in the bail required or fine imposed or punishment inflicted." Id. at 371 (quoting
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)).
59. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 n.1, 667 (1962).
60. Id. at 667.
61. 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). The Court differentiated the result in Weems primarily as
being dependent upon the "accompaniments" (chains and painful labor) of cadena temporal,
and not the term of imprisonment itself. Id. at 273-74.
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ical prohibitions it had placed on death, bright lines would be considerably harder to draw "between one term of years and a shorter
6 2
or longer term of years." 3
These difficulties were overcome in Solem v. Helm three years
later. 3 There, the Court overturned an LWOP sentence as applied
to a nonviolent, repeat, non-juvenile offender.6 4 In passing sentence, the trial court had found that the offender:
certainly earned [the] sentence and [had] certainly proven that
[he was a] habitual criminal and the record would indicate that
[he was] beyond rehabilitation and that the only prudent thing
to do [was] to lock [him] up for the rest of [his] natural life, so
6 5
[he would not] have further victims.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court cited what it described as its
long recognition of proportionality3 and the lack of historic support
for an exception for imprisonment,37 holding that the proportionality principle applied to all criminal sentences. 8 The dissent sarcastically resurrected the line-drawing concerns forecasted in Rummel:
"[t]oday [the Court] holds that a sentence of life imprisonment,
without the possibility of parole, is excessive punishment for a seventh allegedly 'nonviolent' felony. How about the eighth 'nonviolent' felony? The ninth? The twelfth?"6 39 But the battle had been
70
won: as a result of Solem, as-applied constitutional challenges
could be raised against prison sentences. 71 Essentially, this meant
that courts could now invalidate individual prison sentences on proportionality grounds, but courts could not yet apply general cate-

62. Id. at 275.
63. 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
64. Id. at 280.
65. Id. at 282-83 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted).
66. Id. at 286-87 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 349 (1910)).
67. Id. at 288-89.
68. Id. at 290.
69. Id. at 314 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Contrary sentiment among the Court's members
would survive Solem. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (plurality) (arguing that an alternative perspective of the Court's prior jurisprudence was to view the Court
as "treat[ing] [the proportionality] line of authority as an aspect of [its] death penalty jurisprudence").
70. An as-applied challenge is one that challenges a law only "as-applied" to a particular
set of facts. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and FacialChallenges and
Third-PartyStanding, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1337 (2000). In contrast, a facial challenge
seeks to invalidate a law altogether and not just in a particular context, "as-applied" to a
particular plaintiff. See id. (explaining the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges).
71. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 103-04 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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gorical prohibitions to "shield entire classes of offenses and offenders" from prison sentences as was the practice in the realm of capi72
tal punishment.
III.

ADVANCING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT FOR JUVENILES

The Supreme Court applied a categorical prohibition to a nondeath penalty punishment for the first time in Graham,73 foreclosing LWOP for juvenile, non-homicide offenders. 74 The Court
reached this result by applying the two-part test it had historically
reserved for capital cases. 75 Under this test, the Court considers:
[(1)] objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice, to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice
at issue ....

[And, (2)] guided by the standards elaborated by

controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding
and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history,
meaning, and purpose, the Court must determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment
76
in question violates the Constitution.
Under the first prong of this analysis, the Graham Court concluded that a national consensus existed against LWOP for juvenile
non-homicide offenders even though many states had not actually
legislated against it.77 What was significant in the Court's view was
that LWOP was rarely imposed on juvenile non-homicide offenders. 78 The Court's approximate logic was that even though many

states were statutorily authorized to impose LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it was seldom done, and that made it cruel and
unusual punishment when it was imposed. 79
72.
73.

Id. at 101.
Id. at 61-62 (majority opinion).

74. Id. at 74.
75. See id. at 61.
76. Id. at 61 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 64, 66; see also id. at 62 ("Although these statutory schemes contain no explicit
prohibition on sentences of [LWOP] for juvenile non[-]homicide offenders, those sentences
are most infrequent.").

78. Id. at 62-67; see also id. at 67 ("Similarly, the many [s]tates that allow [LWOP] for
juvenile non[-]homicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not be treated as
if they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate.
now under consideration is exceedingly rare.").

79.

The sentencing practice

Id. at 66 (concluding that " [LWOP] for juveniles convicted of non[-]homieide crimes

is as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual"). The dissent parried:

"I cannot agree with the Court that.., citizens should be constitutionally disabled from using
this sentencing practice merely because they have not done so more frequently. If anything,
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Under the second prong, the Court dusted off its reasoning from
Roper v. Simmons, in which the Court had extended a categorical
prohibition on capital punishment to all juvenile offenders under
the age of eighteen. 80 In Roper, the Court expounded on the peculiarity of juvenile offenders, (a subject which it had first broached in
Thompson 8 1):
[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate
yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption. As we understand it, this
difficulty underlies the rule forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as having antisocial personality
disorder, a disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism, and
contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of others. If
trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and
observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality
disorder, we conclude that [s]tates should refrain from asking
jurors to issue a far graver condemnation-that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty. When a juvenile offender
commits a heinous crime, the [s]tate can exact forfeiture of
some of the most basic liberties, but the [s]tate cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.82

the rarity of this penalty's use underscores just how judicious sentencing judges and juries
across the country have been invoking it." Id. at 112-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 68 (majority opinion). The Roper Court was presented with a particularly
blood-chilling set of facts. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 556 (2005). The seventeen-year-old
defendant had broken into a home without apparent reason, took the lone occupant hostage,
bound her hands and feet with electrical wire, wrapped her entire face with duct tape, and
threw her into a river where she drowned. Id. at 556-67. The prosecutor had used Simmons's
youth against him, suggesting that it was an aggravating circumstance rather than a mitigating one. Id. at 558 ('Age ....Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?
Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.'")
(quoting the prosecutor's rebuttal without providing a direct supporting citation).
81. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (logicizing that "[i]nexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure than is an adult"). The Court had also, on one other occasion prior
to Roper, refused to extend the prohibition to capital punishment of juvenile murderers who
were sixteen or seventeen at the time of their crime. See Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
380 (1989), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75.
82. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-74 (citations omitted).

334

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

The Court further built on this reasoning in Graham,noting that
"psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence."83
But the categorical prohibition in Graham, unlike the one in
84
Roper, was to be levied against a non-death penalty punishment.
Thus, the Court would need extra justification to make the leap. To
aid in this endeavor, the Court broke down the distinction it had
previously drawn between death and other punishments. 85 It noted
that, although a sentence of LWOP does not result in an execution,
"the sentence [like death,] alters the offender's life by a forfeiture
that is irrevocable." 86 The Court found this result to be particularly
severe when applied to juveniles because juveniles are, by defini87
tion, younger than non-juveniles and have a longer time to serve.
Additionally, the Court distinguished a non-homicide juvenile offender's scienter with a mathematical formula: "a juvenile offender
who did not kill ... has a twice diminished moral culpability [once
by the] age of the offender and [once by] the nature of the crime...
"88

Summarizing all of this logic led the Graham Court to reject the
penological justification of incapacitation: "[t]o justify [LWOP] on
the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger
to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. . . . [And] incorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth."8 9 In the Court's view, to impose the sentence of LWOP on a

83. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 70 (noting that "a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender").
88. Id. at 69; see also Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth
Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 561-62 (2015) (explaining the Court's synthesis of lessened intent and young age as resulting in a twice-diminished moral culpability); James Donald Moorehead, What Rough Beast Awaits? Graham,
Miller, and the Supreme Court's Seemingly Inevitable Slouch Towards Complete Abolition of
Juvenile Life Without Parole,46 IND. L. REV. 671, 682 (2013) (describing the Court's asserted
distinction between imposing LWOP on juveniles and imposing it on adults as an "equation.").
89. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73 (quotation omitted); see also id. at 79 ("A young person
who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life's end has little incentive
to become a responsible individual.").
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juvenile required a finding that the juvenile's crimes "demonstrate[d] an irretrievably depraved character." 90 The Court described this as a "subjective judgment' 91 which sentencing courts
92
would be unable to make with sufficient accuracy.
Thus, the Graham Court's categorical ban prevented sentencing
judges from making this determination "at the outset,"93 such that
juveniles would have "a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform." 94 Moreover, the Court agreed with the observation of one
amicus that "defendants serving [LWOP] are often denied access to
vocational training and other rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates[, and juvenile offenders] are most in need of
and receptive to rehabilitation." 95 This, in the Court's view, made
the punishment of LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders "all
the more" disproportionate. 9 As the Court opined: "t]he juvenile
should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of
judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential....
[LWOP] gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
97
chance for reconciliation with society, no hope."
Despite such broad justification, the Graham Court included a
failsafe, presumably to limit its holding:
[a] [s]tate is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile . . . [non-homicide offender as long as it gives] some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation ....
It bears emphasis,
however, that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a [s]tate
from imposing [LWOP] on a juvenile non[-]homicide offender,
it does not require the [s]tate to release that offender during
his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as
juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving
of incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth

90. Id. at 76 (quotation omitted).
91. Id. at 76 ("Nothing in Florida's laws prevents its courts from sentencing a juvenile
non[-]homicide offender to life without parole based on a subjective judgment that the defendant's crimes demonstrate an irretrievably depraved character. This is inconsistent with
the Eighth Amendment.") (citation omitted) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 77 ("[I]t does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from
the many that have the capacity for change.").
93. Id. at 75.
94. Id. at 79.
95. Id. at 74 (citing the Brief for the Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11-13, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (No. 08-7412)).
96. Id. at 74.
97. Id. at 79.
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Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of non[-]homicide crimes committed before adulthood
98
will remain behind bars for life.
Its broad policy boiled down, all Grahamreally proscribed was a
sentencing judge from making the subjective decision at sentencing
that a non-homicide juvenile offender's crimes reflect an "irretrievably depraved character" worthy of LWOP. 99
Roughly two years later the Court took its next step in Miller,100
striking down mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile murderers,
relying in part 0 1 on its reasoning in Graham.10 2 What bothered the
Miller Court about mandatory sentencing statutory schemes is that
they did not leave the sentencing authority "any discretion to impose a different punishment." 103 While the Court acknowledged
that Graham's categorical prohibition applied only to juvenile nonhomicide offenders, 104 and reiterated that a state "is not required to
guarantee eventual freedom," 105 the Court considered "none of what
it said about children... [in Graham to be] crime specific."106 Thus,
it was imperative that a judge passing sentence on a juvenile homicide offender at least have the opportunity to consider mitigating
factors, including the offender's youth, before imposing LWOP.10 7 A
statute that unwaveringly mandated LWOP would not provide any
allowance for such an opportunity and was therefore inconsistent
with what the Court had expounded in Roper and Graham.10 8 However, the Miller Court "[did] not foreclose a sentencer's ability" to
determine that a murder committed by a juvenile "reflects irreparable corruption" and sentence the juvenile to LWOP. 10 9 The Court
did note, though, that LWOP would likely be uncommonly imposed
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id. at 76.
100. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
101. The Miller Court also relied upon a second line of precedent pertaining to the constitutionality of mandatory sentencing schemes in general. See id. at 470, 475-76. That case
law is outside the scope of this article.
102. See id. at 474, 479.
103. Id. at 465 (emphasis added); id. at 474 (observing that "these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether ... [LWOP] proportionately punishes a juvenile
offender").
104. Id. at 473.
105. Id. at 479.
106. Id. at 473.
107. Id. at 480.
108. Id. at 479; see also id. at 474 ("That contravenes Graham's(and also Roper's) foundational principle: that imposition of a [s]tate's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children.").
109. Id. at 479-80 (quotation omitted); see also id. at 480 ("fV]e do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases .... ").
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due to "the great difficulty" attendant to distinguishing between
"the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption."'1
Conversely, the Miller Court highlighted the various other "options" discretionary sentencing would
allow: "a judge or jury could choose, rather than [LWOP], a lifetime
prison term with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term of years.
It is easy to imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a
(much) harsher sentence.., while still not thinking [LWOP] appropriate." 111
In essence, the Miller Court only held that a judge or jury passing
sentence on a juvenile homicide offender must be permitted to give
consideration to mitigating factors, including the offender's youth,
before imposing LWOP.1 1 2 At the time of its decision, the Miller
Court did not consider its holding to be implementing any categorical prohibition.11 3 As the Court stated, "[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime...
. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process-considering an offender's youth .... "1 1 4 The Supreme Court
would later revise this interpretation in its most recent chapter of
11 5
its juvenile-sentencing jurisprudence: Montgomery.
The issue squarely before the Court in Montgomery was tangential to its holdings in Graham and Miller, i.e., whether Miller was
"retroactive to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences
were final when Miller was decided."116 This issue invoked the pro117
cedural/substantive distinction enunciated in Teague v. Lane,
which controls whether a newly-announced right protects against
violations that occurred in proceedings before that right was announced.1 1 8 Violations of substantive rights are reviewable, even if
the violation occurred before the right was announced, but violations of proceduralrights are not so reviewable.1 1 9 The Montgomery
Court recast the right in Miller as a substantive right so that it did
110. Id. at 479-80 (quotation omitted).
111. Id. at 489.
112. Id. at 479; see also id. at 480 ("Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to
make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against [LWOP].") (footnote omitted).
113. See id. at 479 ("fV]e do not consider [the] alternative argument that the Eighth
Amendment requires a categorical bar on [LWOP] ...
114. Id. at 483.
115. See Montgomeryv. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
116. Id. at 725.
117. 489 U.S. 288, 307, 312-13 (1989).
118. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728.
119. Id.
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indeed apply retroactively. 120 While the Court agreed that Miller
had a procedural component, 12 1 it rejected the proposition that that
procedural component foreclosed the existence of a substantive
right. 122 Acknowledging that Miller did not "bar a punishment for
all juvenile offenders," 12 3 as was the case in Roper and Graham, the
Court noted that Miller "did bar [LWOP] ...for all but the rarest
of juvenile offenders ... whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility." 124 Essentially, the Court was indicating its recognition of
"juvenile offenders ... whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility" as its own class. 12 5 Thus, it was clear that, in the Court's own
estimation, Miller did indeed announce a categorical prohibition,
one that banned LWOP for a certain class. 12 That class included
"all but the rarest of juvenile offenders ... whose crimes reflect[ed]
permanent incorrigibility." 127 As the Court explained: "[t]he fact
that [LWOP] could be a proportionate sentence for ... [that] kind
of juvenile offender does not mean that all other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the deprivation of a substantive right."128 This dichotomy among what was
previously a unified class (juvenile offenders) shed light on exactly
what kind of juvenile offenders could be constitutionally sentenced
to LWOP. Miller, the Court noted, "did not foreclose a sentencer's
ability to impose [LWOP] on a juvenile [offender] . . . [as long as
that juvenile offender's crimes] reflect[ed] irreparable corruption."1 29 Indeed, "a lifetime in prison [was] disproportionate ... for
all but the rarest of children." 130 However, the Court left it to the
states to determine how exactly to distinguish the incorrigible children from the non-incorrigible ones.13 1 The Court suggested that

120. Id. at 732, 736.
121. Id. at 734 (noting that Miller's procedural component "requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics" before imposing a proportionate sentence).
122. Id. at 735.
123. Id. at 734.
124. Id. (emphasis added).

125. Id.; see also Eighth Amendment-Retroactivity of New ConstitutionalRules Juvenile
Sentencing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REv. 377, 384-85 (2016) (suggesting
that Montgomery is prone to "criticisms of 'sleight of hand'" by its designation of Miller as
protecting non-incorrigible juveniles) (citation omitted).
126. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 726 (quotation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 735 (offering state sovereignty as the reason that the Miller Court did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child's incorrigibility: "When a new
substantive rule of constitutional law is established, this Court is careful to limit the scope
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states need not leave the retroactive application of this constitutionally-protected distinction to the courts. 132 If, for instance, parole consideration was extended to these offenders, a resentencing
hearing was unnecessary: "[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only
transient immaturity-and who have since matured-will not be
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment." 133 Contrariwise, "[t]hose prisoners ...[showing] an inability to reform [would] continue to serve life sentences." 134 This distinction was well-illustrated by the Montgomery
Court's detailed description of the plight of the petitioner immediately before it:
[p]etitioner has discussed in his submissions to this Court his
evolution from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member
of the prison community. Petitioner states that he helped establish an inmate boxing team, of which he later became a
trainer and coach. He alleges that he has contributed his time
and labor to the prison's silkscreen department and that he
strives to offer advice and serve as a role model to other in135
mates.
The Montgomery Court perceived this distinction as honoring
what it termed the "central intuition" of Miller: "that children who
136
commit even heinous crimes are capable of change."

IV.

GRANT: THE SEARCH FOR A LIMITING PRINCIPLE

This troubled world of Supreme Court jurisprudence set the stage
for the Third Circuit panel's decision in Grant.137 Although Grant's

of any attendant procedural requirement to avoid intruding more than necessary upon the
[s]tates' sovereign administration of their criminal justice systems").
132. Id. at 736 (stating that considering the offender for parole could satisfy Miller in lieu
of resentencing).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see Carly Loomis-Gustafson, Comment, Adjusting the Bright-LineAge ofAccountability Within the Criminal Justice System: Raising the Age of Majority to Age 21 Based on
the Conclusionsof Scientific Studies RegardingNeurologicalDevelopment and Culpabilityof
Young-Adult Offenders, 55 DuQ. L. REV. 221 (2017) (canvassing modern scientific research of
juvenile neurological development and arguing for a higher age than that established by
Roper and Graham).
137. United States v.Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018). The case was before Joseph A.
Greenaway, Jr. and Robert E. Cowen, Circuit Judges, and John R. Padova, Senior Judge of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Id. at 134 n.1.
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staying force was short-lived, it built upon prior Supreme Court
precedent in a momentous way. Grant also portends future steps
in the realm of Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing and, for this
reason, it is worthy of attention.
The Grantpanel began its analysis by noting that "[t]he Supreme
Court ha[d] long grappled with the societal bounds of imposing the
most severe punishments[,]" 138 and recounted seriatim the holdings
and rationales of Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. 139 The
panel recognized its task as determining "whether the logic of
[those] cases .

.

. foreclos[ed] [what was termed a] de facto LWOP

for juvenile offenders whose crimes do not reflect irreparable corruption. 140 Grant was a juvenile homicide offender.1 4 1 His first
sentence, under sentencing guidelines effective in 1992, was mandatory LWOP. 142 Mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders
was then held to be unconstitutional in Miller, and Grant was
awarded a new sentence. 143 At this second sentencing, the new sentencing judge remarked that the "record sufficiently evidenced that
[Grant] was not incorrigible." 144 Under Miller, as later interpreted
by the Court in Montgomery, this finding of non-incorrigibility
meant that Grant could not receive an LWOP sentence. 145 Thus,
the sentencing judge sentenced him to a sixty-five year sentence
14
without parole instead.
This result is not proscribed by Miller. Nonetheless, Grant challenged it on the ground that it defeated his "meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation," which the Supreme Court had promised in Miller.147 In short,
Grant argued that his prison sentence exceeded his life expectancy
(as "diminish[ed]" by the effects of prison), 148 and even if it did not,

138. Id. at 137.
139. Id. at 138-42. Unsurprisingly, the panel amplified the policy of protecting non-incorrigible juveniles rather than heeding the Supreme Court's previously imposed bright lines.

Id.
140. Id. at 138 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
141. Id. at 136.
142. Id.; see also Grant v. United States, No. 12-6844 (JLL), 2014 WL 5843847, at *1
(D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2014).
143. Grant, 887 F.3d at 136.
144. Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
145. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
146. Grant, 887 F.3d at 137.
147. Id. at 134 (quotation omitted).
148. Id. at 142. Grant, under the second sentence he received, would not be eligible for
release until age seventy-two. Id. Grant argued that decades of prison reduce life expectancy
and that, factoring the effects of prison into his life expectancy, reduced it to age seventytwo. Id. Thus, according to Grant, he had no meaningful opportunity for release. Id. The
government, for its part, disputed Grant's calculation and argued that Grant's real life ex-
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that "a meaningful opportunity for release must afford him an opportunity for 'personal fulfillment."' 149 He supported these contentions with "various mortality estimates and social scientific studies. 150 The Third Circuit, agreeing with Grant, concluded that a
"de facto" life sentence, defined by the panel as "[a] term-of-years
sentence without parole that meets or exceeds the life expectancy
of a juvenile offender who is still capable of reform," 15 1 violates the
Eighth Amendment because it deprives juvenile offenders of their
"meaningful opportunity" for release, 152 and that "the Supreme
Court's concerns about the diminished penological justification for
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders apply with equal strength
to de facto LWOP sentences."1 53 The panel also made clear that its
holding "extend[ed]" to sentences of juvenile non-homicide offenders because, under Graham, such offenders are non-incorrigible "by
definition." 154 Even the government had agreed in principle that a
sentence exceeding a non-incorrigible juvenile offender's life expectancy unconstitutionally deprived that offender of their meaningful
155
opportunity for release.
This conclusion is well-grounded in reason and seems to follow
logically from the Supreme Court's precedent. Once the Supreme
Court had promised a meaningful opportunity for release, it defies
logic to conclude that all that is prohibited is LWOP. A 254-year
prison sentence, for instance, defeats a meaningful opportunity for
release just as soundly as does LWOP. 156 Or, as the Third Circuit
reasoned, "[the] distinctive attributes [of juveniles] are equally relevant regardless of the ... formal distinction between de facto and
de jure LWOP sentences." 157 "[A] de facto LWOP sentence cannot
possibly provide a meaningful opportunity for release because it relegates the juvenile offender to spending the rest of his or her life
pectancy was 76.7. Id. at 142 n.8. Release sometime before death, the government contended, is all that Miller required. Id. "Some years," or in this case, 4.7 years (76.7 minus
72) outside prison walls was enough. Id. at 147.
149. Id. at 147.
150. Id. at 147; see also id. at 142.
151. Id. at 142.
152. Id (quotation omitted).
153. Id. A sentence that lasts for the life of the convict by its express terms is a de jure
life sentence. In contrast, a de facto life sentence is a term-of-years sentence that is so long
that it is likely to extend beyond the life of the convict. As astute courts have noted, the
convict dies in prison either way.
154. Id. at 142 n.7.
155. Id. at 142 n.8 (recounting that the government argued that Grant's sentence was
permissible because it did not exceed his life expectancy); see also id. at 147.
156. See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a 254-year
prison sentence precluded a meaningful opportunity for release).
157. Grant, 887 F.3d at 144.
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behind prison bars and prohibits him or her from ever reentering
society." 158 Predictably, the Third Circuit was not the first circuit
court of appeals to take a step beyond the Supreme Court. The
panel noted in Grant that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had previously concluded: "[t]he 'children are
different' passage ... from [Miller] cannot logically be limited to de
jure life sentences as distinct from sentences denominated in num159
bers of years yet highly likely to result in imprisonment for life."
This decision is an easy one to make where a sentence is so long
that it obviously precludes a meaningful opportunity for release.
This is so whether it is the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit striking down 131.75 years in prison without the possibility of parole,16 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit striking down 127 years and two-months in prison
without the possibility of parole,16 1 or the Seventh Circuit striking
down two consecutive fifty-year prison terms without opportunity
for release.16 2 In all of these cases, it was all but certain that the
juvenile offenders would die in prison. 1 3 Yet, however valid and
compelling this logic might be, it cuts against the literal rules of
Graham,Miller, and Montgomery, which hold only that a meaningful opportunity for release prohibits LWOP.16 4 Once circuit courts
blaze beyond these narrow confines, they are not only freed (or rather unmoored) from any "semantic classifications" imposed by legislatures,16 5 but are also beyond the purview of Graham,Miller, and
Montgomery. When the prison sentence under consideration is ex-

158. Id. at 145.
159. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McKinleyv. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016));
accord Moore, 725 F.3d at 1194; Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 2017).
160. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1050; see also id. at 1056 ("The Constitution's protections do not
depend upon a legislature's semantic classifications. Limiting the Court's holding by this
linguistic distinction would allow states to subvert the requirements of the Constitution by
merely sentencing their offenders to terms of 100 years instead of 'life.") (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
161. See Moore, 725 F.3d at 1186 ("Because Moore would have to live to be 144 years old
to be eligible for parole, his chance for parole is zero.").
162. McKinley, 809 F.3d at 909; see also id. at 911 ("[I]t is such a long term of years (especially given the unavailability of early release) as to be-unless there is a radical increase, at
present unforeseeable, in longevity within the next 100 years-a de facto life sentence, and
so the logic of Miller applies.") (emphasis added).
163. See Budder, 851 F.3d at 1056; Moore, 725 F.3d at 1186; McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911.
164. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479
(2012); Montgomeryv. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016). The Third Circuit also cited to
United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 2016) as the only case to hold
that Miller only proscribed mandatory and not discretionary LWOP sentences. Grant, 887
F.3d at 146. But, the Third Circuit explained, "Jefferson misses the point of Graham and
Miller .... " Id.
165. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1056.
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treme, the Graham, Miller, and Montgomery meaningful-opportunity-for-release standard provides adequate guidance by which
circuit courts may vacate the sentence. 11 But when the prison sentence under consideration not so obviously deprives a juvenile offender of his meaningful opportunity for release, the constitutional
question now turns upon semantics. The Tenth Circuit was correct
when it observed that these semantics are no longer sourced in statutory boundaries. 137 But a determination that was previously determined by statutory semantics now turns upon a determination
which depends upon the efficacy of some studies predicting the life
expectancy of the juvenile offender.16 8 The semantics of legislative
schemes have been exchanged for the semantics of the logic of
courts. This is shaky ground on which to rest a constitutional guarantee.
Whether Grant would be released at some point before his death
was (and still is) a close call. 1 9 Thus, the Third Circuit, in dealing
with a sentence that did not obviously deprive Grant of his opportunity for release, endeavored to set forth a limiting principle to
guide courts' discretion. 170 As a starting point, a meaningful opportunity for release must mean that the sentence is something less
than a "de facto" life sentence. 171 The panel referred back to the
broad language of Graham as:
the essence of what a "meaningful opportunity for release" is:.
•.an opportunity for release at a point of time in [the non-incorrigible juvenile offender's] life that still affords "fulfillment
outside prison walls," "reconciliation with society," "hope," and
"the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self172
recognition of human worth and potential."
This "mandate," the Third Circuit provided, "encompasses more
than mere physical release at a point just before ... life is expected
to end." 173 In other words, the Third Circuit recognized that the
166. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
167. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1056.
168. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 147. The court noted that Grant relied on "various" mortality
estimates and social scientific studies to establish his life expectancy. Id. The government
countered that Grant was erroneously measuring his life expectancy from birth and contended that his life expectancy was longer when appropriately measured from his present
age (then forty-four). Id.
169. See id. (noting that according to the various statistics presented, Grant could conceivably live to age 72 or even 76.7).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 144.
172. Id. at 147 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
173. Id.
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rationale compelling the Supreme Court's prior holdings was
broader than those holdings themselves. Thus, the panel discarded
the government's proffered hope-for-some-years-outside-prisonwalls standard as "too narrow in light of the [Supreme] Court's
statements." 174 But the hunt for an alternate, workable benchmark
by which 'meaningful opportunity for release' might be measured
was an elusive one.
To accomplish its objective (i.e., defining 'meaningful opportunity'), the Third Circuit began by instituting what it termed a "legal framework." 175 Under this framework, sentencing judges would
first be required to factually determine the juvenile offender's life
expectancy to ensure that a juvenile offender would not be sentenced to a term-of-years that exceeded the juvenile offender's life
expectancy. 17 Having established a base determination that did
not really get it any closer to its principle objective, the Third Circult engaged in the following soliloquy:
at what age is one still able to meaningfully reenter society after release from prison? Is there a principled reason for why,
say, a juvenile offender can properly reenter society at age fifty
but not at age sixty? At age sixty but not at age seventy? We
believe not.... [W]e are not aware of any widely accepted studies to support such precise line drawing on a principled basis
in the prison release context.177
This conundrum is not new. In fact, it is a reincarnation of the
dilemma presaged by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent to Solem,
where the Supreme Court first unmistakably applied the concept of
proportionality to prison sentences some thirty-five years earlier:
[t]oday [the Court] holds that a sentence of life imprisonment,
without the possibility of parole, is excessive punishment for a
seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony. How about the eighth
"nonviolent" felony? The ninth? The twelfth? 178

174. Id. at 148 (emphasis added) (noting, however, that the Supreme Court has expressly
declined to guarantee juvenile offenders release from prison).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 149. Such a determination in itself, the Grant panel noted, was fraught with
dilemmas. Id. at 149-50 (quoting United States v. Mathurin, 868 F.3d 921, 932 (1lth Cir.
2017) (noting the equal protection issues that would arise were sentences tailored to expectancy data because life expectancies vary according to race and sex). To avoid this constitutional quagmire, the panel mandated individualized evidentiary hearings to determine each
juvenile offender's life expectancy. Id.
177. Id. at 150.
178. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Regardless of whether proportionality is an aid to Eighth Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence, proportionality in the
realm of prison sentences presents judges with an amorphous
standard that can produce radical results. The Third Circuit's attempt to place a principled limit on a term-of-years sentence bears
this out: in Grant,the court adopted "a rebuttable presumption that
a non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be afforded an opportunity for release before the national age of retirement."179 Three
observations are instructive in light of this result.
First, consider how the panel arrived at this place. The panel
found it "clear" that "society accepts the age of retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual permanently leaves the work
force after having contributed to society over the course of his or her
working life." 180 What is not particularly convincing about the
panel's pronouncement is that a term in prison can be fruitfully
analogized to a lifelong career. Recognizing the difficulty of an1 81
nouncing the "precise national age of retirement" with certainty,
the panel declined to "definitively determin[e] [that] issue."18 2 Instead, the panel was content to consider sixty-five as an "adequate
approximation" and leave the precise determination to sentencing
courts.1 83 Perhaps, in light of this holding, the panel's assessment
that it "goes no further" than prior Supreme Court holdings is not
particularly convincing. 184 The Supreme Court, after all, had never
contemplated measuring the meaningful-opportunity-for-release
standard by a person's age of retirement.
Second, consider what the panel's proffered rule does not mean.
Although the panel defined the constitutional right-meaningful
opportunity for release before the national age of retirement-it
seemingly did not extend that right to all non-incorrigible offenders.1 85 This is because it is only a "rebuttablepresumption."1 8 Thus,
under Grant, a non-homicide offender under Graham (non-incorrigible by default8 7 ) and a non-incorrigible homicide offender under
Miller, could presumably still be deprived of a meaningful opportunity for release before retirement age. Because this right does
179. Grant, 887 F.3d at 152 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 151.
182. Id. at 152.
183. Id. at 151-52.
184. Id. at 148.
185. Id. at 152 ("We do not, however, categorically foreclose the possibility that a district
judge may sentence a non-incorrigible juvenile offender beyond the national age of retirement
. . . . 1).

186.
187.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 142 n.7.
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not necessarily apply evenly to all non-incorrigible offenders, it
might very well be understood as inconsistent with both Graham
and Miller which required a meaningful opportunity for all members of both classes of non-incorrigible juvenile offenders. 188 This
inconsistency can presumably be resolved by reading Grant to still
require that meaningful opportunity for release occurs sometime
after the age of retirement. This contingency would arise where a
non-incorrigible juvenile offender, although capable of reform, still
189
warranted a greater sentence under other sentencing factors.
Moreover, provided that a sentencing judge determines that a homicide juvenile offender is incorrigible in the first instance, the protection against a term of years past the age of retirement (even up
to LWOP) slips away and Grant, for all of its own hortatory language, provides no more certain protection than Miller.1 90 Thus,
the holding in Grant is somewhat ambiguous. It can be viewed as
a gargantuan leap ahead of the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence, or because it is so hemmed in, as a diminutive one. So perhaps the panel was justified in its perception that this holding did
not transgress the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence.1 91
Finally, consider whether the panel's "age of retirement" rule accomplished what the panel intended and whether it is actually consistent with Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. The holdings of
those three cases transformed LWOP imposed upon juvenile offenders into a constitutional issue and, by doing so, largely took it "from
the realm of democratic decision."1 92 Once the Third Circuit panel
accepted the premise that the spirit of these three cases abolished
not only de jure but also de facto LWOP sentences, 193 it followed
inexorably that courts would have to define what constituted a de
facto LWOP sentence. Thus, the burden falls on courts, rather than
legislatures, to determine how many years of incarceration imposed
upon juveniles for specific offenses is too many years, such that it
deprives the juvenile offenders of their constitutional right to a

188. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (non-homicide offenders); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (reinterpreting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012) to prohibit LWOP for the class of non-incorrigible homicide offenders).
189. Grant, 887 F.3d at 152 (citing to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012), which include
"the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," and forecasting that instances where such factors counsel a sentence beyond the
national age of retirement "will be rare and unusual").
190. Id. at 153.
191. Id. at 148.
192. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015).
193. Grant, 887 F.3d at 142.
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"meaningful opportunity to obtain release." 194 In effect, by following this path, the panel may have extricated juveniles from being
subject to a legislature's "semantic classifications," 195 but the result
it reached delivers juveniles to instead be ensnared by a semantic
classification of the panel's own invention.
Indeed, the "age of retirement" rule, requiring the meaningful opportunity for release to come before the age of sixty-five, is no less
arbitrary than any rule that could be imposed by a legislature. 19
After all, the age-of-retirement rule could, in some circumstances,
encourage sentencing judges to pass a longer sentence than they
otherwise would by relying on Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
alone. Consider that by capping the maximum sentence in this way,
a seventeen-year-old offender receiving the maximum possible sentence under Grant'sproposed rule would receive a shorter sentence
than a fourteen-year-old offender receiving the maximum possible
sentence (e.g., compare forty-eight years' imprisonment without the
possibility of parole (14 + 48 = 62), with fifty-one years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole (14 + 51 = 65)). Under Grant
this outcome is constitutionally sound but perhaps a future Third
Circuit panel or the court en banc would disagree. Perhaps a future
Third Circuit or the court en banc would regard it as logically perverse, a mere stopgap provision levied simply because the earlier
holding had to draw the line somewhere (and perhaps the Third
Circuit has already decided this by granting rehearing and vacating
the panel's opinion). But if this is true, was the panel's sixty-fiveyear-old bright-line rule simply kicking the can down the road, until
a future court has the opportunity to follow logic further into the
semantic wormhole, and draw a new constitutional line in a completely new place? If so, the constitutional right to a meaningful
opportunity for release is certainly chameleonic in nature, meaning
one thing today and a different thing tomorrow. Perhaps the obser197
vation that "[1l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt"
is nowhere more apt than in the context of imprisonment, the literal
deprivation of a person's physical freedom.

194.
195.
196.
197.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 2017).
Grant, 887 F.3d at 150-5 1.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).

348
V.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 58

CONCLUSION: WAITING FOR THE SUPREME COURT (OF FOR

CONGRESS)
In the interests of clarity and consistency, it is imperative that
the Third Circuit en banc resists the invitation to wade into the
quagmire of Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing logic for two
main reasons.
First, it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to advance its
own constitutional bright lines. As a plurality of the Supreme Court
enunciated in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation,Inc., "a
necessary concomitant of the doctrine of stare decisis [is] that a
precedent is not always expanded to the limit of its logic." 198 For
instance, the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana disapproved
of expansively reading a prior case, Coker v. Georgia, to "state a
broad rule" reaching beyond its specific holding. 199 In Coker, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman. 200 In Kennedy, the Court was
faced with deciding whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited
capital punishment for the rape of a child. 20 1 Although the Court
answered that question in the affirmative, the Court emphatically
rejected the argument that Coker had already answered that question despite noting the seemingly "logical" merit that that argument
possessed. 202 The Kennedy Court acknowledged that confined to
one particular passage, "Coker's analysis ...[was] susceptible of a
203
reading that would prohibit making child rape a capital offense."
However, the Court emphasized that "Coker's holding was narrower
20 4
than some of its language read in isolation."
The same is true of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. In each of
these three cases where the Supreme Court has invalidated legislative bright lines, the Court has necessarily redrawn those lines in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Ultimately, it is the
prerogative of the Supreme Court to set the bright lines by which
all other courts must abide. 205 Thus, the Third Circuit should adopt
the Eighth Circuit's position, and abide by the narrow holdings of
those three cases. 206 Under this approach, Grahamwould only pro-

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

551 U.S. 587, 615 (2007).
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 428-29 (2008).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413.
See id. at 426-27.
Id. at 428.
Id.
See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33 (2006).
United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 2016).
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hibit LWOP (and nothing else) for juvenile non-homicide offenders, 207 Miller would only prohibit mandatory LWOP (and not discretionary LWOP) 208 for juvenile homicide offenders, 2 9 and Montgomery would only prohibit discretionary LWOP with respect to nonincorrigible homicide offenders. 210 While such a restrictive approach would exclude any of these cases' more expansive language
from being operative, it would also neatly comport with the three
cases' express holdings. 21 1 It is these holdings that should be con21 2
trolling rather than what is simply dicta.
Such a result would also comport with fundamental fairness. Because different federal courts could and do come to different conclusions, juvenile offenders could be subject to differing standards as
to what constitutes a meaningful opportunity for release where
term-of-year sentences approach, but do not equate to, de facto
LWOP sentences. 21 3 Thus, unless and until the Supreme Court
weighs in, the Third Circuit should adhere to the express holdings
of Graham,Miller, and Montgomery and leave any logical advancement or subsequent line-drawing to the Supreme Court. 21 4 Indeed,
the Third Circuit panel itself recognized this obligation, and the
207. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).
208. This issue is currently on certiorari before the Supreme Court. See Malvo v.
Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 18-217, 2019 WL 1231751, at *1
(U.S. Mar. 18, 2019).
209. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
210. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
211. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33 (2006) ("[T]he duty of
a court of appeals [is] to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself
chooses to expressly overrule them."); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
212. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 428-29 (2008) (responding to the argument
that it was "possible" that Coker be understood to "state a broad rule" covering child rape:
"Coker's holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation.... The opinion
does not speak to the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape, an issue not then
before the Court.").
213. "What kind of Equal Justice under Law is it that-without so much as a '[s]orry about
that'-gives as the basis for [subjecting] one person [to a sentence] arguments explicitly rejected in refusing to [subject] another?" Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 619 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
214. Although appellate courts defer to Supreme Court dicta as a general matter, see In
re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig., 860 F.3d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied
sub nom., Ferrellgas Partners, LP v. Morgan-Larson, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 647 (2018), such deference can go too far. See id. (stating that " [a]lthough panels have held that federal courts are
'bound' by Supreme Court dicta, this goes too far"). Where a federal court must decide between either (1) following a clear holding of the Supreme Court, or (2) giving effect to Supreme Court dicta that would have the effect of obliterating the bright line previously set by
the clear holding, the federal court should stick with the clear holding. This is especially true
where the lives ofjuvenile offenders hang in the balance.
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court en banc should also heed it.215 Dissimilar to the result in
Coker, the Supreme Court could very well decide that the holdings
in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery are the absolute limit of the
constitutional requirement, hortatory language notwithstanding. 21
But for now, the bright lines set forth in those cases are the Court's
21 7
last word.
Second, it is ultimately Congress, rather than the courts, that has
the ability to implement the solution that is needed to satisfy the
constitutional requirements of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
In Frothinghamv. Mellon, the Supreme Court enunciated the general rule that federal taxpayers lack standing to challenge a federal
statute's constitutionality. 21 8 When the Supreme Court subsequently decided Flast v. Cohen, there had been "confusion" as to
whether Frothingham had announced an absolute constitutional
bar to taxpayer standing or "simply impos[ed] a rule of [judicial]
220
self-restraint." 21 9 The Flast Court decided that it was the latter.
Expressing concern in his dissent, Mr. Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote the following:
[i]t seems to me clear that public actions, whatever the constitutional provisions on which they are premised, may involve
important hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal
judiciary.... [T]here surely can be little doubt that they strain
the judicial function and press to the limit judicial authority.
There is every reason to fear that unrestricted public actions
might well alter the allocation of authority among the three
branches of the Federal Government. It is not, I submit,
enough to say that the present members of the Court would not
seize these opportunities for abuse, for such actions would,
even without conscious abuse, go far toward the final transformation in the Council of Revision which, despite Madison's
support, was rejected by the Constitutional Convention.... We

215. United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating "we are bound to
follow the mandate of the Supreme Court. . . .")(quotation omitted).
216. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 428.
217. See id.
218. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
219. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968).
220. Id. at 93. Interestingly, it was precisely this exception to the general rule of no taxpayer standing that the Supreme Court was unwilling to advance in Hein. Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 590 (2007). Confronted with the argument that it
was arbitrary' to distinguish between money spent pursuant to congressional mandate and
expenditures made in the course of executive discretion," id. at 609, the plurality responded
that "a necessary concomitant of stare decisis is that a precedent is not always expanded to
the limit of its logic." Id. at 615.
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must as judges recall that, as Mr. Justice Holmes wisely observed, the other branches of the Government "are the ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
221
great a degree as the courts."
The lesson from Flast is instructive in the present context. Crim222
inal sentencing laws are at the heart of the legislative function.
As multiple Supreme Court justices have observed, the Constitution makes for a clumsy tool when it comes to fine-tuning legislative
schemes. 223 To acknowledge this maxim is not to diminish the judiciary's significant role in overseeing the constitutionality of criminal justice. 224 It is merely to state that not every criminal sentencing question should be injected with Eighth Amendment significance. In order to sustain the viability of the system, courts must
be willing to rely on coordinate branches of government as co-equal
'
"guardians of the liberties. "225
The verity of this premise is even stronger when the simplest solution in a given context is a legislative one. Such is the case here:
providing parole eligibility for all juvenile offenders would comfortably and easily satisfy the requirements of Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery. Of course, for this solution to be viable, Congress
would have to re-establish a federal parole system. 22 With such a
system, it would be difficult to argue under Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery that any term-of-years prison sentence, no matter how
long, deprives a juvenile offender of a meaningful opportunity for
release as long as that juvenile offender is eligible for parole. The
221. Flast,392 U.S. at 130-31 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
222. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that
'questions of sentencing policy [are] to be determined by Congress and the state legislatures
...
[because] [d]etermining the length of imprisonment that is appropriate for a particular
offense and a particular offender inevitably involves a balancing of interests").
223. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
("Federal courts are blunt instruments when it comes to creating rights. They have constitutional power only to resolve concrete cases or controversies; they do not have the flexibility
of legislatures to address concerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems
that may arise from the exercise of a new right."); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted) ("I am persuaded that this rulemaking function can be performed more effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy judicial fiat, and that the Federal Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by the [s]tates in the development of such rules."); Miller, 567 U.S. at 515 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that "[t]he Eighth Amendment imposes certain limits on the sentences that may be imposed in criminal cases, but for the most part it leaves questions of
sentencing policy to be determined by Congress and the state legislatures . . .
224. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 514-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
226. See United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for all sentences, including life imprisonment).
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Supreme Court has twice now suggested the expediency of this option in this context. The Court first entertained the option in Miller 227 and elaborated on its potential in Montgomery: "[a]llowing
those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juvenile H
•.[offenders] will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence
in violation of the Eighth Amendment." 228 Although the difficulty
of how far into a sentence the Constitution requires a juvenile offender be considered for parole would remain, this approach would
alleviate the strain on sentencing courts in attempting to ferret out
the requirements of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery with respect
to each offender. 229 If by its references in Miller and Montgomery,
the Supreme Court is signaling to Congress that congressional action is required, then the federal judiciary should be unified in this
resolve.
In summary, the Third Circuit should exercise forbearance and
decline to wade through the quagmire of Eighth Amendment logic.
Not only will this permit time for congressional action, it will also
respect the constitutional bright lines which the Supreme Court has
already drawn. For no bright line can be perfectly drawn and somewhere the quixotic pursuit of perfect logic must die.

227. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
228. Montgomery v.Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
229. Id.; see also United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 149 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting the
approach of formulating specific sentences tailored to each individual offender's life expectancies as unworkable).

